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On June 30th, 2019, the European Union signed a trade agreement and an
investment protection agreement with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. This is the
third time the EU has used its exclusive competence in the field of foreign direct
investment (FDI) to conclude an investment protection agreement (IPA) vis-à-vis an
extra-European country, after CETA’s investment chapter and the EU-Singapore
IPA.
With this “new generation” of investment treaties, the EU has the chance to
contribute to the ongoing reform of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), a
system which is increasingly attracting legitimacy concerns as its popularity grows.
Until now, the EU has been primarily focusing on the weaknesses of the ISDS
procedural framework by pushing for the institutionalization of ISDS. This effort
resulted in the establishment of the Investment Court System (“ICS”) — a two-tier
semi-permanent tribunal where the adjudicators are randomly chosen from tribunal
members pre-appointed by the Contracting Parties. This mechanism, designed to
replace the traditional ISDS regime, has been incorporated in the CETA and in the
EU-Vietnam Investment protection agreement (EUVIPA) with virtually no difference.
The lack of due consideration of country specifics in investment negotiations:
The case of Vietnam
Except for some variations, the investment agreements the EU has concluded
so far are indeed quite similar. Significantly, Jean-Claude Juncker referred to the
ICS as a “template for all EU investment negotiations”. In 2010, the Commission
expressed the inappropriateness of a one-size-fits-all EU model for investment
agreements. Yet, nine years and three treaties later, the question arises as to
whether the EU is instead shaping its international investment policy around a model
treaty. Model-based negotiations benefit policy consistency and help the EU secure
its achievements in the ISDS reform. However, it is important that the EU adjusts its
policy objectives according to the distinctive features of each negotiating partner and
adopts a flexible understanding of the relevant concepts of international investment
law when it negotiates with Canada rather than with Vietnam. This is particularly
so for the drafting of the more substantive provisions of investment treaties, where
the EU is not as progressive as with the procedural ones. As will be shown, the
investment agreement with Vietnam would have required more proactive solutions to
the concerns over the legitimacy of ISDS system.
Vietnam is a one-party socialist, yet strongly capitalist republic, where the human
rights record “remains dire in all areas”, according to Human Rights Watch.
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Relevantly to the investment sector, “farmers continue to lose land to development
projects without adequate compensation”. In 2018, the Ministry of Planning and
Investment held a conference to celebrate the 30 years of FDI attraction, during
which it denounced some enterprises “being not serious in implementing regulations
on environmental protection”. Vietnam concluded investment treaties with 45
countries and currently counts 28,954 valid FDI projects.
Vietnam’s peculiar background draws attention to two contentious issues at the
core of the criticism towards the ISDS regime, namely its potential to prevent policy
development by discouraging domestic regulation and the lack of investor obligations
in traditional BITs. Before analyzing how the EUVIPA addresses these two concerns
and why they are relevant in the case of Vietnam, it is important to bear in mind that
sustainable development forms an integral part of the common commercial policy
(see CJEU Opinion 2/15) and that, therefore, the EU is legally obliged to take these
problems into account in investment negotiations.
Enough space for public interest?
Emerging economies heavily dependent on FDIs, like Vietnam, are particularly
vulnerable to the aforementioned risk of a regulatory chill. They are indeed
faced with the challenge of regulating with the fear of an investor challenge or of
discouraging new FDIs, necessary for the country’s economic growth. Art. 2.2.
EUVIPA addresses this point by reaffirming states’ “right” to regulate to achieve
several listed policy objectives (e.g. protection of public health, safety, etc.), even
when it could negatively affect investments. By “reaffirming” this right, the Parties
recognize a State’s preexisting prerogative, as opposed to conceiving it as an
exception to the State’s obligations under the treaty.
Still, the framing of this right in the EUVIPA may be too general to lower the risk of
claims or to ensure that the outcome of the case does not entail a reduction of the
state’s regulatory capacity. The right to regulate clause should indeed be designed in
light of the specific priorities of a state and anticipate the public measures that may
be challenged in order to exclude them from the admissible claims. An instance of
this approach is Art. 21(3) of the Southern African Development Community Model
Treaty (“Right to Pursue Development Goals”), which refers to measures necessary
to address historically based economic disparities suffered by minority groups.
Likewise, under Art. 29.5 of the Transpacific Partnership Agreement—a treaty which
however never entered into force— a Party could elect to deny the benefits of the
investment chapter concerning claims challenging a tobacco control measure, thus
shielding itself from such a claim.
In the same vein, due consideration to the state’s responsibility to implement
international obligations would have required the inclusion of a “hierarchy” or
“supremacy” clause (similar to that of NAFTA, Art. 104), which is not present in the
EUVIPA. These clauses ensure that any international agreement for the protection
of the environment, labour standard, or human rights binding on both parties prevails
over the EUVIPA in case of inconsistency.
International investment law: Still a one-way system under the EUVIPA
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The second criticism towards investment treaties, mentioned above, is that they
typically do not address investors’ obligations and responsibility. However, the
inclusion of investor obligations — especially human rights ones — in investment
treaties is particularly crucial in the case of legal systems too weak to regulate
foreign corporations’ conduct and with dismal human rights records, like that of
Vietnam.
EUVIPA hints at investors’ conduct only indirectly at Art. 3.27(2). This provision
limits the access to the ICS by precluding investors from submitting claims against
the host-state if the investment was made through fraudulent misrepresentation,
concealment, corruption or other conduct amounting to an abuse of process. In light
of the foregoing considerations on human rights in Vietnam, this limitation should
have also been applied to investments obtained, established or carried out through
human rights violations, or violations of domestic and international law protecting the
environment or regulating labour standards. Besides, Art. 3.27 merely constraints
investors’ right to resort to the ICS, but does not establish liability for illegal corporate
conduct. Two policy choices demand consideration in this regard. First, the EUVIPA
does not impose obligations on investors. As is well-known, corporate liability for
human rights violations cannot be established under international law since there
exists no binding international instrument placing human rights obligations on
business enterprises. Thus, it is particularly important that investment treaties fill this
gap by creating investor obligations. For instance, Art. 18 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT
requires investors to uphold human rights obligations and Art. 9 of the Indian Model
BIT (2015) to respect anti-corruption laws. Again, these clauses would have been
appropriate in light of the reports on the respect of human rights in Vietnam and
on its corruption record (see the Transparency International Corruption by country
index). Second, EUVIPA does not allow states to bring claims against investors,
nor states’ counterclaims, now admissible under several agreements. It thus fails to
address the concern of the one-sided nature of ISDS. This seems inconsistent with
the idea of the ICS as an institution better placed to judge on public policy issues
if compared to classic investment arbitration, often said to be biased in favour of
investors.
Furthermore, the EUVIPA does not comprise a Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) clause, imposing the duty on investors to engage in socially responsible
practices. Art. 13.14 of the EU-Vietnam FTA’s chapter on Trade and Sustainable
Development states that the Parties “may” work together in “promoting corporate
social responsibility and accountability, including with regards to the internationally
agreed instruments that have been endorsed or are supported by each Party”.
Art. 13.10 states that the Parties agree to “promote” CSR and lists the possible
measures which can be pursued to this end. However, these provisions are directed
at the signatory States and not at investors. They are contained only in the free
trade agreement, but not in the investment protection one. This suggests that
they were not meant to interfere with investment protection under the IPA. Still,
such provisions are increasingly frequent in BITs, even if most of them feature a
non-binding language (e.g. Art. 12 of the Indian model and Art. 24 of the Nigeria-
Morocco BIT). The choice to omit such a clause in an investment agreement is
questionable, especially when it involves countries that lack solid domestic laws
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regulating corporate conducts or have not yet acceded to the relevant international
instruments (e.g. Vietnam has not adhered to the OECD Guideline on Multinational
Enterprises).
The EU’s engagement in the ISDS reform — foremost at the procedural level — is
undeniable. Yet, highlighting some elements of the EUVIPA, this post showed that
EU’s contribution is far from revolutionary. Especially with respect to its substantive
provisions, the EU did not sufficiently use its rule-making role to advance the
most progressive solutions to the ISDS legitimacy crisis, which Vietnam’s peculiar
domestic context certainly called for.
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